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Insider Trading Under Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Bypassing the Personal Benefit Test 
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) 
Andrew J. Meyer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Insider trading is broadly defined as the use of material nonpublic 
information in connection with the trade of stock or other securities.1  To 
the average person, the classic case of insider trading is a corporate 
executive reaping handsome personal profits by trading stock using insider 
information that he obtained through his position within the corporation.  
The reality, however, can be much more complicated.  
While insider trading is generally illegal under federal law, the laws 
regulating it do not explicitly mention the term “insider trading.”2  In 
addition, not all forms of insider trading are prohibited.3  Instead, a series 
of statutes and rules that prohibit fraud more generally are the basis for 
prosecuting insider trading.4  Specifically, Section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5, promulgated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), bar persons from 
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Science & Technology, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 
2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021.  I would like to thank 
Professor Thom Lambert and Jessica Schmitz for their insight, guidance, and support 
during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the 
editing process. 
 1. Akhilesh Ganti, Insider Trading (Feb. 25, 2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insidertrading.asp [https://perma.cc/LS3A-
ET78]. 
 2. Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 600 (2020). 
 3. Id. at 596. 
 4. Id. at 597. 
1
Meyer: Insider Trading Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Bypassing the Personal Bene
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
952 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
committing fraud in connection with the sale or purchase of any security.5  
Because those who engage in insider trading typically make no affirmative 
representation when they trade securities, any “fraud” would have to 
consist of a failure to speak in the face of a duty to do so.6  Thus, the courts 
have found insider trading liability where a person has a duty to speak 
before trading but instead remains silent.7  In other words, an insider at a 
corporation owes a duty to the shareholders of the corporation because he 
is an agent of it.8  Therefore, the insider has a duty to disclose any material 
nonpublic information to the person on the other end of the security 
transaction prior to its completion.9  For example, the failure of a CEO to 
publicly disclose the loss of a lucrative business opportunity prior to 
selling his stock in the corporation would be fraud under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.10 
Insiders clearly have a duty to disclose; however, not all traders that 
use material nonpublic information are insiders to a corporation.11  These 
outsider traders generally receive information from an insider in the form 
of a tip.  To expand liability to these individuals, the United States 
Supreme Court created the personal benefit test.12  The personal benefit 
test determines when the recipient of a tip (“tippee”) inherits a duty to 
disclose from the source of the tip (“tipper”).13  The test states that a tippee 
inherits a duty when the tipper shares material nonpublic information for 
personal benefit, and the tippee knows, or should know, that the tipper 
breached his duty in sharing it.14 
In 2002, Congress enacted a new securities fraud provision, 18 
U.S.C. § 1348, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).15  
Congress created this criminal statute in response to the scandals of Enron, 
 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(2)(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 6. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1980). “One party to a 
business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other 
before the transaction is consummated…matters known to him that the other is entitled 
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them….” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977). 
 7. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861–62 
(2d Cir. 1968). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983). 
 13. Id. at 662. 
 14. Woody, supra note 2, at 607–08. 
 15. Id. at 615. 
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Global Crossing, Worldcom, and Adelphia, and it contains language 
similar to that of Rule 10b-5.16  Section 1348 was largely ignored for years, 
but a 2019 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit brought it to the forefront.17  In United States v. Blaszczak, the 
Second Circuit considered whether the personal benefit test should extend 
to the newer Section 1348 securities provision.18  There,  a tipper and 
tippees were charged with securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 and Section 
1348.19  At trial, the jury acquitted the defendants of securities fraud under 
Rule 10b-5, but convicted them under Section 1348.20  The trial court 
instructed the jury to use the personal benefit test for the Rule 10b-5 
charges but not for the Section 1348 charges.21  On appeal, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that when a person is 
charged with securities fraud under Section 1348, the personal benefit test 
from Rule 10b-5 securities fraud jurisprudence does not apply.22 
 
 16. Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 
671–72 (2002); Woody, supra note 2, at 616. 
 17. Woody, supra note 2, at 618–19. 
 18. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 29. 
 22. Id. at 37. In September 2020, three of the defendants in Blaszczak petitioned 
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari and Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Blaszczak v. United 
States, 141 S.Ct. 1040 (2021) (No. 20-5649); On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 35, Olan v. United States, 
141 S.Ct. 1040 (2021) (No. 20-306). The Court granted the petition on January 11, 
2021, vacated the judgment, and remanded it back the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit.  Blaszczak,141 S.Ct. at 1040; Olan, 141 S.Ct. at 1040. The 
Court instructed the Second Circuit to further consider the case in light of Kelly v. 
United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). Blaszczak,141 S.Ct. at 1040; Olan, 141 S.Ct. at 
1040. In Kelly, the Court held that a political revenge scheme by state officials to close 
lanes on the George Washington Bridge in Fort Lee, New Jersey was an exercise of 
regulatory power and not a scheme of money or property under 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 
1343 (2018). 140 S. Ct. at 1574. Kelly is important because there is a question in 
Blaszczak as to whether confidential government information is property for the 
purposes of the fraud statutes in Title 18. Id.; Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 34. In Blaszczak, 
the defendants were convicted of fraud under Section 1343 in addition to 18 U.S.C. § 
1348. 947 F.3d at 45. The Dissent in Blaszczak argued that confidential government 
information is not property under the Title 18 fraud statutes. Id. at 47–48 (Kearse, J., 
dissenting). When vacating the judgment and remanding the case, the Court did not 
instruct the Second Circuit to reconsider the other issue of Blaszczak which is the topic 
of this Note. See 141 S.Ct. at 1040; Olan, 141 S.Ct. at 1040. That issue is whether the 
personal benefit test applies to Section 1348. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 30–37. On 
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This Note will discuss the history of insider trading law and analyze 
the reasoning of the Second Circuit.  Part II outlines the facts and holding 
of Blaszczak, Part III analyzes the background and theories of insider 
trading liability under Rule 10b-5 and Section 1348, and Part IV describes 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Blaszczak.  Finally, Part V critiques the 
Second Circuit’s decision and suggests changes to the future of insider 
trading law. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Between 2009 and 2014, defendants David Blaszczak, Theodore 
Huber, Robert Olan, and Christopher Worrall engaged in two schemes to 
pass and use confidential government information from the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to make securities trades.23  
Worrall worked at CMS, Blaszczak worked as a “political intelligence” 
consultant for hedge funds, and Huber and Olan worked at Deerfield 
Management, L.P., a healthcare-focused hedge fund.24  
CMS is a federal agency within the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services that manages and administers large 
government health programs including Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program.25  As a regulatory agency, the rules 
CMS adopts affect businesses and organizations within the health 
industry.26  Specifically, CMS determines reimbursement rates for medical 
treatments covered by the health programs it manages.27  
 
April 2, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a post-remand brief that conceded that, 
in light of Kelly, confidential government information is not property under the Title 
Title 18 fraud statutes. David E. Brodsky et. al., DOJ Concedes Error In Title 18 
Insider Trading Convictions After Supreme Court’s “Bridgegate” Decision, CLEARLY 
GOTTLIEB (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.clearyenforcementwatch.com/2021/04/doj-
concedes-error-in-title-18-insider-trading-convictions-after-supreme-courts-
bridgegate-decision/ [https://perma.cc/FX6E-U5TB]. As a result, the Department of 
Justice asked the Second Circuit to reverse the Title 18 convictions. Id. As of the time 
of publication, it is unknown what will happen with the Second Circuit’s prior holding 
on the personal benefit test because it does not need to revisit the issue if it reverses 
the Title 18 convictions. Id. 
 23. Id. at 26. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Julia Kagan, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), 
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/us-centers-
medicare-and-medicaid-services-cms.asp [https://perma.cc/S8CQ-GMWY]. 
 26. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 47 (Kearse, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. 
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The first scheme involved Blaszczak passing confidential 
information from CMS about upcoming reimbursement rate changes for 
medical treatments to Huber and Olan.28  Prior to becoming a hedge fund 
consultant, Blaszczak worked at CMS along with fellow defendant 
Worrall, one of Blaszczak’s sources.29  Defendants Huber and Olan 
approached Blaszczak to obtain confidential CMS information because 
they knew Blaszczak enjoyed unique access to this information through 
his sources at the agency.30  On four separate occasions, Blaszczak passed 
confidential information about pending reimbursement rate changes to 
Huber and Olan, which they used to make stock trades on several 
companies that would be affected by the changes.31  In one instance, Huber 
and Olan received information from Blaszczak about a reduction in the 
reimbursement rate for certain radiation oncology treatments.32  Huber and 
Olan then used this confidential information to enter orders that “shorted” 
approximately thirty-three million dollars’ worth of stock in a radiation 
device manufacturer.33  When shorting a stock, a person bets that the stock 
price will decrease and he profits when it does.34  In other words, Huber 
and Olan bet that the manufacturer’s stock price would decrease after the 
information became public, which, in this case, resulted in a profit of over 
two million dollars.35  Huber and Olan believed that Blaszczak’s 
information gave them an edge in the market, and through these trades, 
Huber and Olan’s hedge fund accumulated approximately seven million 
 
 28. Id. at 27 (majority). 
 29. Id. at 26–27. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Shorting a stock or short selling is a trading strategy where a person hopes to 
profit by betting that the stock price of a company will go down. Adam Hayes, Short 
Selling, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 13, 2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp [https://perma.cc/B3W6-
ZMF3].  For example, Person A short sells by borrowing a stock from Person B and 
selling it to Person C at the current market price. Id. Person A then plans to re-buy the 
stock at a lower price, return it to Person B, and then pocket the difference.  Id.  
However, this is a highly speculative trading strategy that has a risk of unlimited loss 
because a stock price can theoretically increase to infinity. Id. Therefore, if the stock 
price does not decrease, Person A needs to buy the stock back at a higher price in order 
to return the stock to Person B. Id. 
 35. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 27. 
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dollars in profits.36  They described their relationship with Blaszczak as a 
“money printing machine.”37   
In the second scheme, which occurred around the same time as the 
first, Blaszczak shared similar confidential information with Christopher 
Plaford at another hedge fund.38  Like Huber and Olan, Plaford also 
believed that the information provided by Blaszczak gave him an edge in 
the market and that it was more accurate than that from other sources 
because Blaszczak’s information originated from the “horse’s mouth.”39  
Plaford used the confidential information to make trades similar to those 
made by Huber and Olan.40  On one occasion, Plaford accumulated 
approximately $330,000 in profit.41 
The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed an eighteen-
count indictment related to these two trading schemes.42  The charges 
included conspiracy centering on misappropriation of confidential 
information, conversion of United States property, wire fraud, securities 
fraud under Rule 10b-5, and securities fraud under Section 1348.43  
The DOJ tried the case before a jury starting on April 2, 2018.44  
Because none of the defendants apart from Worrall owed a duty to speak 
before trading, they would have to inherit such a duty under existing Rule 
10b-5 precedents.45  Accordingly, the jury instructions for the Rule 10b-5 
securities fraud counts included the personal benefit test.46  Specifically, 
the trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict the defendants of 
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, the government needed to prove that 
Worrall, who owed a duty to CMS as an employee, tipped confidential 
information in exchange for a personal benefit, and that each of the other 
defendants knew that Worrall disclosed the information in exchange for a 
personal benefit.47  The trial court, however, denied the defendants’ 
 
 36.  Id. at 27–28. 
 37. Id. at 27. 
 38. Id. at 28. Plaford was a portfolio manager at Visium Asset Management, L.P. 
who pleaded guilty and testified against Blaszczak as a cooperating witness. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 28–29. 
 43. Id. at 26, 29. The court in Blaszczak refers to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as Title 
15 securities fraud and refers to § 1348 as Title 18 securities fraud. Id. at 26. 
 44. Id. at 29. 
 45. Id. at 26 (Worrall was an employee of CMS and therefore owed a duty as an 
agent while the others were outsiders and had no pre-existing duty). 
 46. Id. at 29. 
 47. Id. 
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request to include the personal benefit test in the Section 1348 securities 
fraud instructions.48  Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that in order 
to convict the defendants of Section 1348 securities fraud, the government 
needed to prove only that the defendants knowingly and willingly 
participated in a fraudulent scheme to embezzle or convert confidential 
information by “wrongfully taking the information and transferring it to 
his own use or the use of someone else.”49  The jury instructions for the 
Rule 10b-5 charges covered fourteen pages of the trial transcript and 
included ten elements, whereas the Section 1348 instructions spanned 
fewer than five pages.50  The jury returned a verdict on May 3, 2018, which 
acquitted all defendants of the Rule 10b-5 securities charges, but convicted 
Blaszczak, Huber, and Olan of the Section 1348 securities charges.51  
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendants argued that the trial 
court erred in refusing to include the personal benefit test in the jury 
instructions for securities fraud under Section 1348.52  The court held that 
when a person is charged with securities fraud under Section 1348, the 
Rule 10b-5 personal benefit test does not apply.53 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In the United States, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC 
Rule 10b-5 are the primary bases for prosecuting insider trading.  Over the 
years, federal courts crafted insider trading law by interpreting Rule 10b-
5 to cover such conduct.54  More recently, the Section 1348 fraud provision 
of Sarbanes-Oxley has also been used by the DOJ to prosecute insider 
trading.55 This section will first discuss the history of insider trading under 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Antonia M. Apps & Katherine R. Goldstein, Can the Government 
Circumvent “Newman’s” Personal Benefit Test?, 262 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (2019), 
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/2/v2/126268/NYLJ-12.02.2019-
Milbank.pdf [https://perma.cc/K64V-SQRT]. 
 51. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 29–30. 
 52. Id. The defendants challenged their convictions on several other grounds 
arguing that (1) confidential CMS information is not property for the purposes of Title 
18 wire and securities fraud, (2) the defendants’ convictions were affected by legal 
and factual errors, (3) the evidence was insufficient, (4) there was a misjoinder of 
counts for Blaszczak, and (5) the district court made evidentiary errors. Id. at 30. 
 53. Id. at 37. 
 54. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 
843 (2d Cir. 1968); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980); Dirks v. 
S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 55. See, e.g., Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 29. 
7
Meyer: Insider Trading Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Bypassing the Personal Bene
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
958 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including the main theories for liability 
developed by the courts.  Then, it will address the fraud provision of 
Section 1348. 
A. Theories of Liability under SEC Rule 10b-5 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits those buying or selling 
securities from using “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention” of rules or regulations prescribed by the SEC.56  In 1942, 
the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 based upon the authority of Section 10(b).57  
Rule 10b-5 provides that it is unlawful for any person, either directly or 
indirectly, to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.58  The SEC originally 
adopted Rule 10b-5 to address securities fraud and not insider trading.  In 
the 1960s, however, the SEC started to use the rule to combat an increasing 
number of insider trading cases.59   
Over the years, the courts interpreted Rule 10b-5 to forbid insider 
trading, and several of those pivotal cases provide the basic framework of 
insider trading law today.  Initially, the courts developed the Disclose or 
Abstain Doctrine to cover any persons using material nonpublic 
information.60  Then, they limited liability to only insiders with fiduciary 
 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange… [t]o use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors . . . .”). 
 57. Zachary J. Gubler, Insider Trading As Fraud, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 533, 542 
(2020). 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) 
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”). 
 59. Gubler, supra note 57, at 542–53. 
 60. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d 
Cir. 1968). 
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duties under the Classical Theory.61  Next, they expanded liability to 
outsiders without fiduciary duties by creating the personal benefit test.62  
Finally, they created liability for complete outsiders to a company under 
the Misappropriation Theory.63 
1. The Early Days and the  
Disclose or Abstain Doctrine 
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, a company performing exploratory 
drilling on a parcel of land discovered valuable minerals.64  To facilitate 
the acquisition of the property, the president of the company ordered the 
exploration group to keep the results of the drilling confidential.65  The 
president did not inform the company’s stock option committee or its 
board of directors about the mineral find.66  Before the information became 
public, several insiders at the company made stock trades based on the 
information.67  From the time the drilling began to the time the information 
became public, the stock price increased from approximately seventeen 
dollars per share to over fifty-eight dollars per share.68  The SEC filed a 
complaint against the insiders for violating Rule 10b-5. The trial court 
found some of the insiders guilty and dismissed the charges against the 
others.69  On appeal, however, the Second Circuit affirmed the findings of 
guilt but reversed the dismissals.70  It held that anyone possessing material 
inside information must either disclose the information before trading in 
securities or abstain from trading if unable to disclose.71  The court 
reasoned that the purpose of Rule 10b-5 was to ensure that all investors 
should have relatively equal access to material information.72  The court 
found that the defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by not disclosing the 
 
 61. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
 62. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 63. See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19 (1987); U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997). 
 64. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 844. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 847. 
 69. Id. at 839, 842. 
 70. Id. at 842–43. 
 71. Id. at 848. 
 72. Id. 
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information or abstaining from trading.73  This became known as the 
Disclose or Abstain Doctrine.74 
2. The Classical Theory of Insider  
Trading and The Personal Benefit Test 
The Disclose or Abstain Doctrine from Texas Gulf Sulphur remained 
the primary rule regarding insider trading until the 1980s.75  Subsequently, 
two cases, Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC, reshaped insider-
trading law by limiting liability from anyone possessing inside 
information to only those who owe a fiduciary duty.76  This is known as 
the Classical Theory of insider trading.77 
In Chiarella, an employee of a printing company determined the 
identity of corporations being targeted in takeover bids by examining 
documents used in the process of printing takeover announcements.78  
Using this information, and without disclosing it, Chiarella  purchased 
stock in the target corporations and immediately sold the stock after the 
takeover bid was made public.79  Chiarella gained approximately $30,000 
in profit over fourteen months through those trades.80  The trial court 
convicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of violating Rule 10b-5, and he 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.81  The Court held that 
Chiarella’s failure to disclose the information was not fraud under Rule 
10b-5.82  The Court reasoned that, under common law, a failure to disclose 
material information before a transaction is fraud only when there is a duty 
to speak.83  In this instance, Chiarella had no duty because he was not an 
agent of the target corporations, and therefore owed no duty to the 
shareholders whose stock he purchased.84  Rather, Chiarella was a 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Woody, supra note 2, at 603. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 604. 
 77. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal 
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 151, 157 (2011). 
 78. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 225. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 228. 
 84. Id. at 232. 
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“complete stranger” to his trading partners.85  For there to have been a duty 
for Chiarella to speak, a duty to all participants in market transactions 
would need to exist.86  The Court declined to recognize such a duty 
because doing so would depart “radically from the established doctrine 
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties….”87  The 
Court did not find any intent from Congress or the SEC to warrant such a 
departure.88 
Dirks v. SEC built upon Chiarella by creating the personal benefit 
test for situations where an insider, a tipper, tips information to an outsider, 
a tippee.89  In Dirks, Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst, received 
information about accounting fraud at a corporation that sold life insurance 
and mutual funds from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of the 
corporation.90  Dirks investigated the fraud and disclosed his findings to 
the Wall Street Journal which refused to publish the story.91  While Dirks 
and his company did not trade on the corporation’s stock, Dirks openly 
discussed his investigation with several clients and investors who used the 
information to make trades.92  After the stock price began to fall 
precipitously, the SEC filed a complaint against the corporation 
committing accounting fraud and opened an investigation into Dirks.93  At 
an administrative hearing, the SEC found that Dirks violated Rule 10b-5, 
among other laws, by sharing the fraud allegations with the investor 
community.94  The SEC reasoned that although Dirks was an outsider, and 
therefore did not have an existing fiduciary duty to the corporation, Dirks 
inherited Secrist’s fiduciary duty by knowingly receiving the 
information.95  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC’s findings.96  
The United States Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, 
finding that Dirks did not violate Rule 10b-5 because Secrist did not 
receive a personal benefit for disclosing the information.97  The Court’s 
 
 85. Id. at 232–33. 
 86. Id. at 233. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 90. Id. at 648–49. 
 91. Id. at 649–50. 
 92. Id. at 649. 
 93. Id. at 650. 
 94. Id. at 650–51. 
 95. Id. at 655–56. 
 96. Id. at 652. 
 97. Id. at 652. 
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analysis initially reaffirmed the holding in Chiarella in that there cannot 
be a violation of Rule 10b-5 unless there is a breach of a duty.98  However, 
the Court stated that a tippee does not acquire a duty merely by receiving 
material nonpublic information from an insider who does owe a duty.99  
Instead, the tippee inherits a duty by receiving the information 
improperly.100  This occurs when (1) an insider-tipper breaches his duty by 
sharing the information, and (2) the tippee knows or should have known 
there has been a breach by the insider.101  
The Court then turned to the question of what constitutes a breach on 
the part of the insider.102  In answering that question, the Court noted that 
not all disclosures of material nonpublic information constitute a breach 
of the insider’s duty to the shareholders.103  The Court explained that in 
some cases, whether information is material and whether it is nonpublic, 
might not be apparent to an insider.104  The Court acknowledged that the 
purpose of the securities laws is to eliminate the use of material nonpublic 
information for personal advantage.105  Thus, the Court reasoned that an 
insider must receive a personal gain either directly or indirectly for there 
to be a breach of duty, and if there is no breach of duty by the insider, then 
there is no breach by the tippee.106  In this case, the Court held that neither 
Secrist, Dirks, nor Dirks’s clients committed insider trading because 
Secrist did not gain a personal benefit for tipping off Dirks, which meant 
that neither Dirks nor his clients who traded inherited a duty to disclose 
the information before trading.107 
The preceding cases, among others, created doctrines known as the 
Classical Theory of insider trading and the personal benefit test for 
inheriting a duty to speak before trading.  As exemplified by Chiarella, 
the Classical Theory holds that an insider commits insider trading by 
failing to disclose his material nonpublic information to a trading partner 
to whom the insider owes a duty to disclose.108  The personal benefit test, 
shown by Dirks, holds that a tippee inherits the duty of the tipper when the 
tippee knows or should have known that the tipper breached his duty by 
 
 98. Id at 654. 
 99. Id. at 660. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 661. 
 103. Id. at 661–62. 
 104. Id. at 662. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 666–67. 
 108. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). 
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providing material nonpublic information in exchange for a personal 
benefit.109 
3. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
While the classical theory and the personal benefit test covered 
situations where an insider breaches his fiduciary duty by either using the 
information or tipping it to another for personal benefit, another theory of 
insider trading emerged after Chiarella and Dirks.110  The 
misappropriation theory developed to cover situations where an outsider 
breaches a duty arising out of a relationship of trust or confidence and he 
misappropriates and uses material nonpublic information in a securities 
transaction.111  In contrast to the classical theory, the misappropriation 
theory involves fraud against the source of the material nonpublic 
information instead of the buyer or seller of a security.112 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the 
misappropriation theory as applied to Rule 10b-5 in Carpenter v. United 
States.113  In Carpenter, a reporter wrote a daily column in the Wall Street 
Journal that discussed selected stocks and gave a positive or negative 
analysis about them.114  The information and the analysis in the column 
did not come from an insider at a corporation, but the column had the 
potential to impact stock prices after publication.115  The Journal had a 
policy that the contents of the column were its property and that they were 
to remain confidential before publication.116  The reporter and other 
defendants, however, entered into a scheme to pass along the column’s 
contents and to make trades upon it.117  In total, the defendants made a 
profit of approximately $690,000.118  
 
 109. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. The tipper in such a situation is liable because sharing 
material nonpublic information to obtain a personal benefit is tantamount to trading 
on the information; the personal benefit test is merely a substitute for trading gains.  
Id. at 663–64. 
 110. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 111. George F. Gabel, Jr., Annotation, Who may be liable under 
“misappropriation theory” of imposing duty to disclose or abstain from trading under 
§ 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b–
5 (17 CFR § 240.10b–5), 114 A.L.R. Fed. 323 (1993). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 114. Id. at 22. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 23. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York and the Second Circuit found the reporter guilty of violating Rule 
10b-5 because he breached his duty of confidentiality to the Journal by 
misappropriating the column’s confidential contents.119  Both courts 
reasoned that, although the Journal was not a buyer or seller of stock in 
these transactions, the Journal was the victim of the fraud and the fraud 
fell within the definition of Rule 10b-5 because it was “in connection with” 
the purchase or sale of securities.120  On appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, the justices split equally on the question of whether Rule 
10b-5 reached the defendant’s conduct and that equal division resulted in 
affirmance of the Second Circuit’s decision.121  
In addition to the charges under Rule 10b-5, the reporter in Carpenter 
was also charged with and convicted of mail and wire fraud under Title 18 
of the United States Code.122  The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 
and the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, each prohibit a scheme or 
artifice to defraud by means of the mail or by wire, radio, or television.123  
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that 
the conspiracy to trade in the Journal’s confidential information fell within 
the mail and wire fraud statutes.124  The Court reasoned that the Title 18 
 
 119. Id. at 23–24. 
 120. Id. at 24. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 21. 
 123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, 
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use 
any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything 
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for 
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any 
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to 
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any 
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial 
interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or 
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction 
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom 
it is addressed, any such matter or thing….”) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
1343 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, 
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, 
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice….”) (emphasis added). 
 124. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27–28. 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/10
2021] SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST 965 
 
mail and wire fraud statutes reach any scheme that uses false or fraudulent 
pretenses to deprive another of his money or property.125  The Court stated 
that the term “defraud” in the Title 18 statutes had a common 
understanding of wronging a person of his property rights by dishonest 
schemes and that fraud includes the act of embezzlement which is a 
fraudulent appropriation of money or goods for personal use by a person 
entrusted to care for the money or goods.126  It also stated that “a person 
who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge 
or information for his own personal benefit but must account to his 
principal for any profits derived therefrom.”127  Thus, while the Court in 
Carpenter did not explicitly endorse the misappropriation theory as 
applied to fraud in Rule 10b-5, it unanimously adopted the 
misappropriation or embezzlement theory as it applies to fraud in the Title 
18 statutes.128 
The United States Supreme Court revisited the question of whether 
the misappropriation theory applies to Rule 10b-5 in United States v. 
O’Hagan.129  In O’Hagan, a partner in a law firm obtained confidential 
information regarding a client’s offer to purchase another corporation.130  
The partner did not represent the client, but received the information from 
fellow partners working with the client.131  The partner used this 
information to purchase stock options in the target corporation, which 
resulted in profits of more than four million dollars.132  A jury found the 
partner guilty of violating Rule 10b-5, but the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that liability under Rule 
10b-5 cannot be grounded on the misappropriation theory of securities 
fraud.133 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit on this 
last point.134  The Court reasoned that the misappropriation theory satisfied 
Rule 10b-5’s requirement that there be a “deceptive device” in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities.135  The Court described the fraud in 
 
 125. Id. at 27. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 27–28. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 130. Id. at 647. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 647–48. 
 133. Id. at 649. 
 134. Id. at 650. 
 135. Id. at 653. 
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Rule 10b-5 as of the “same species” as the fraud of the Title 18 mail and 
wire fraud statutes addressed in Carpenter.136  It acknowledged the 
Carpenter Court’s observation that the misappropriation of confidential 
information in violation of a fiduciary duty is fraud akin to 
embezzlement.137  In clarifying that the misappropriator’s deception 
consists of pretending loyalty to the source of the information while 
converting that source’s information for personal gain, the Court in 
O’Hagan explicitly applied the misappropriation theory of insider trading 
to Rule 10b-5.138   
B. Securities Fraud Under Section 1348 
In 2002, the United States Congress created a new securities fraud 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, modeled after the Title 18 mail and wire fraud 
provisions discussed above.139  Section 1348 prohibits the use of any 
scheme or artifice to defraud any person in connection with any security 
and forbids obtaining any security through false or fraudulent pretenses.140 
Congress created Section 1348 through the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.141  After the implosion of Enron and a string of other scandals 
involving Global Crossing, Worldcom, and Adelphia, legislators crafted 
Sarbanes-Oxley at “lightning speed” amongst a political firestorm, a 
falling Dow Jones Industrial Average, and an election year, which all led 
 
 136. Id. at 654. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 653–54. Justice Ginsburg notes in the opinion that the fraud in a 
misappropriation case consists of “feigning fidelity to the source of information.” Id. 
at 655. 
 139. Woody, supra note 2, at 615; see supra note 123 (text of Title 18 mail and 
wire fraud statutes). 
 140. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (“Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, 
a scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud any person in connection with any commodity for 
future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or any security of 
an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); or (2) to obtain, by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or 
property in connection with the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery, 
or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or any security of an issuer with a 
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned 
not more than 25 years, or both.”). 
 141. Woody, supra note 2, at 615. 
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to its near unanimous passage.142  The collapse of Enron and its auditor, 
Arthur Anderson LLP, politically weakened two groups affected by the 
legislation, the business community and the accounting profession.143  As 
a result, “[t]he healthy ventilation of issues that occurs in the usual give-
and-take negotiations over competing policy positions, which works to 
improve the quality of decisionmaking [sic], did not occur in the case of 
[Sarbanes-Oxley].”144  Legislators did not attempt to reconcile their policy 
proposals with conflicting literature nor did they follow up on comments 
that “hinted at the existence of studies inconsistent with those 
[proposals].”145  Furthermore, legislators typically sympathetic to the 
business community acquiesced and determined “that it would be 
politically perilous to be perceived as obstructing the legislative process 
and portrayed as being on the wrong side of the issue.”146  These 
circumstances resulted in a disorganized statute that spanned 150 pages of 
text and affected three separate titles of federal law.147  The Act also 
created provisions that were duplicative and inconsistent with existing 
laws.148  As one commentator stated, “it is reasonable to expect, as with 
other recent securities legislation, that significant unintended 
consequences will arise.”149 
According to a Senate Report from the Judiciary Committee on 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress added Section 1348 to provide a provision in 
the criminal code through which securities fraud could be prosecuted.150  
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, prosecutors relied upon either existing mail and 
wire fraud charges or specific existing securities laws or regulations such 
as Rule 10b-5 that contained technical legal requirements.151  These 
methods proved to be challenging because prosecutors had to prove use of 
the mail or wires to carry out the fraud, and defendants could rebut 
arguments they possessed the requisite criminal intent with technical legal 
requirements.152  
 
 142. Perino, supra note 16, at 671–72. 
 143. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Perino, supra note 16, at 672. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 674. 
 150. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002). 
 151. Id. at 6. 
 152. Id. 
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The Senate Report on Sarbanes-Oxley contained several statements 
speaking to the purpose and requirements of the new securities statute.153  
The report stated 
[a]lthough we believe that existing criminal statutes are adequate to 
prosecute criminal acts involving securities fraud, we support the 
creation of a new securities fraud offense. In our view this provision 
will make it easier, in a limited class of cases, for prosecutors to prove 
securities fraud by eliminating, for example, the element that the mails 
or wires were used to further the scheme to defraud.154   
The report further asserted that “[t]he provision would supplement 
the patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a more 
general and less technical provision, with elements and intent 
requirements comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud 
statutes.”155  Section 1348 would not lower the standard of criminal intent 
needed to convict securities fraud offenders.156  Consistent with existing 
bank, health care, and securities fraud statutes, prosecutors would need to 
prove that a “defendant knowingly engaged in a scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or knowingly made false statements or representations to obtain 
money in a securities transaction.”157  
The intent of Congress in enacting Section 1348 and the species of 
embezzlement discussed in Carpenter became significant factors to the 
court in Blaszczak.158  
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In United States v. Blaszczak, the Second Circuit held that the 
personal benefit test from Rule 10b-5’s tipping jurisprudence does not 
apply in cases in which a person is charged with securities fraud under 
Section 1348.159  The Second Circuit began its analysis by comparing the 
wording of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to Section 1348 and the fraud 
 
 153. Id. at 2, 32–38. 
 154. Id. at 30. 
 155. Id at 14. 
 156. Id. at 30. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 1348; Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–28 (1987); 
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 32–36 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 159. 947 F.3d 19, 37 (2d Cir. 2019).  The Dissent, which will not be discussed in 
this Note, argued that the charges against the defendants should not be affirmed 
because the information misappropriated by the defendants was not property for the 
purposes of the fraud statutes.  Id. at 46 (Kearse, J., dissenting). 
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prohibited by each of them.160  First, it noted that while none of the existing 
statutes mentioned a personal benefit test, the provisions shared “similar 
text” and prohibited certain schemes to defraud.161  One such scheme is 
the misappropriation theory of fraud.162  
Next, the Second Circuit discussed the origin of the personal benefit 
test and linked it specifically to Section 10(b).163  It noted that Congress’s 
intention in creating Section 10(b) was to protect the free flow of 
information in the securities markets while eliminating the use of insider 
information for personal advantage.164  The court acknowledged that Dirks 
accomplished this by holding that an insider did not breach his fiduciary 
duty by tipping the information unless he received a personal benefit.165  
The Second Circuit cited two cases in addition to Dirks, holding that the 
personal benefit test derives from Rule 10b-5 and is consistent with the 
purposes of securities laws.166   
The Second Circuit then discussed the embezzlement theory of fraud 
used in Carpenter.167  The court stated that once the personal benefit test 
is “untethered” from the statutory context of Section 10(b), the test finds 
no support in the embezzlement theory of fraud advanced by Carpenter.168  
The court reasoned that, in embezzlement, there is no additional 
requirement that an insider breach a duty to the owner of the information 
because it is impossible to embezzle money without committing a fraud.169  
Thus, the court noted that, because a breach of duty is inherent in the 
embezzlement theory from Carpenter, there is no additional requirement 
that the government prove a breach, let alone prove that an insider tipped 
the information for a personal benefit.170  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the personal benefit test is not grounded in the embezzlement theory 
of fraud and it depends entirely upon the intent of the Exchange Act.171  
 
 160. Id. at 35. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (quoting Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983)). 
 165. Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–64). 
 166. Id. at 35–36 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–64); United States v. Chestman, 
947 F.2d 551, 581 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 
287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)). 
 167. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–
28 (1987)). 
 168. Id. (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26–28). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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Next, the Second Circuit concluded that the embezzlement theory 
advanced by Carpenter applied to securities fraud under Section 1348.172  
To assess congressional intent in creating Section 1348, the court 
examined the Senate Judiciary Report for Sarbanes-Oxley.173  Quoting the 
report, the court noted that Congress passed Section 1348 to supplement 
the existing patchwork of securities law provisions with a less technical 
and a more general provision with elements – including intent 
requirements – similar to the existing bank and healthcare fraud statutes.174  
The court concluded that the purpose of Section 1348 was to provide 
prosecutors with a different and broader enforcement mechanism than 
Rule 10b-5 to address securities fraud.175  As a result, the court declined to 
extend the personal benefit test to Section 1348 because it does not share 
the same statutory purpose as Section 10(b).176 
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ policy arguments in favor 
of extending the personal benefit test to Section 1348.177  The defendants 
argued that if the test was not extended to Section 1348, prosecutors would 
be able to prosecute insider trading with less difficulty by bypassing the 
personal benefit test altogether.178  However, this argument failed to 
persuade the court, which reasoned that Congress possessed the power to 
create a broader securities fraud provision and that it was not the role of 
the courts to “check that decision on policy grounds.”179  
Ultimately, the court concluded that the personal benefit test should 
not be extended to Section 1348 because it does not find support in the 
embezzlement theory of fraud in Carpenter and because Section 1348 
serves a different statutory purpose than Section 10(b).180 
V. COMMENT 
While the decision in Blaszczak streamlined insider trading 
prosecution by making it easier for the government to prove guilt, it 
simultaneously complicated the relevant law by upending decades of 
carefully crafted judicial precedent and sowing confusion among 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002)). 
 174. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002)). 
 175. Id. at 36–37. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 37. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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securities professionals.181  Additionally, the two arguments put forth by 
the Second Circuit to support its decision not to extend the personal benefit 
test to Section 1348 have weaknesses. Lastly, a policy argument can be 
made against the result in this case.  
A. The Second Circuit Streamlined Prosecution but Complicated 
Existing Law 
By refusing to extend the personal benefit test to Section 1348, the 
Second Circuit reduced the burden on the government of proving insider 
trading and simplified the process of prosecuting it.182  Rather than using 
Rule 10b-5, prosecutors can use Section 1348 to bypass the personal 
benefit test altogether.183  In future prosecutions, based upon the jury 
instructions in Blaszczak, the government would only need to prove that a 
defendant knowingly and willingly participated in a fraudulent scheme to 
embezzle or convert confidential information.184  This change is further 
evidenced by the nearly ten-page difference in the length of the jury 
instructions used for Rule 10b-5 and Section 1348.185  It is not a stretch to 
believe that a jury of persons with little to no experience in securities law 
will have an easier time understanding the much shorter instructions of 
Section 1348.  In determining guilt under Section 1348, the jury will not 
have to enter the mind of the defendants to determine whether the tipper 
received a personal benefit by tipping the information or whether the 
tippee knew or should have known that the tipper breached his duty.186  
The Dirks Court itself acknowledged the difficulty of proving a personal 
benefit, observing that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally 
benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
easy for courts.”187  
Despite this simplification, the Second Circuit also complicated 
insider trading law.  Because of the result in Blaszczak, there are now two 
 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 29. 
 185. Apps & Goldstein, supra note 50, at 2. 
 186. See id. Whereas the United States Supreme Court in Dirks requires proof that 
the tippee know or should know that the tipper divulged confidential information for 
personal benefit, the Second Circuit requires proof that the tippee must know. 
Compare Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983), with United States v. Newman, 
773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
420 (2016). 
 187. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
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ways in which a person could be liable for insider trading.188  The first 
method is via the traditional route using Rule 10b-5 by either a civil 
proceeding brought by the SEC or a criminal proceeding brought by the 
DOJ.189  The second method allows the DOJ to bring criminal charges 
under Section 1348.190  Though both methods attempt to accomplish the 
same goal of combatting insider trading, each achieves it in different way, 
which results in differing outcomes.191  This is exemplified in Blaszczak 
by the opposing rulings on the Rule 10b-5 and Section 1348 charges.192  
The investor community has expressed similar concerns over this 
decision.193  The Alternative Investment Management Association,194 in 
support of a rehearing en banc by the Second Circuit, argued that the ruling 
in Blaszczak creates “uncertainty and overdeterrence by removing a 
longstanding and well-known limitation” in the personal benefit test.195  
Although the Association agreed with the Second Circuit that the text of 
Section 1348 is materially identical to the text of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, the Association argued that determining the source of information 
in connection with making trades can be difficult to ascertain in a practical 
sense.196  It posited that the lack of clarity stemming from upending 
decades of precedent can create significant compliance costs, lead to 
inefficiency in market trading, and deter the use of lawfully obtained 
information.197  This argument is similar to the sentiment of the Dirks 
 
 188. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37. 
 189. Brett Atanasio, Mark Cahn, Elizabeth Mitchell, Theresa Titolo & Wilmer 
Hale, Insider Trading Law Alert: The Second Circuit Clears the Path for Insider 
Trading Convictions Absent a Dirks Personal Benefit, JD SUPRA (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/insider-trading-law-alert-the-second-82209/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4YH-WCRZ]. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37. 
 193. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Alternative Investment Management 
Association, Ltd. in Support of Rehearing En Banc at 1, United States v. Blaszczak, 
947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811), 2020 WL 1040817, at *1. 
 194. “The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) is the global 
representative of the alternative investment industry, with around 2,000 corporate 
members in over 60 countries. AIMA’s fund manager members collectively manage 
more than $2 trillion in hedge fund and private credit assets.” About AIMA, AIMA, 
https://www.aima.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2020). 
 195. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Alternative Investment Management Association, 
Ltd. in Support of Rehearing En Banc at 6, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 
18-2811), 2020 WL 1040817, at 6. 
 196. Id. at 5–6. 
 197. Id. 
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Court, which stated that “it is essential…to have a guiding principle for 
those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s 
inside-trading rules.”198 
Beyond simply complicating existing law, the decision of the 
Blaszczak court also defies sound public policy.199  Having similarly-
worded statutes that punish analogous conduct differently does not make 
sense and leads to confusion and a lack of understanding by the public of 
what is and is not a lawful use of information.  After forty years of judicial 
precedent creating insider trading law, it may be time for Congress to step 
in and properly enact a statute dedicated specifically to insider trading.  
Forty years of judicial decisions should give Congress enough test cases 
to create a provision that clearly delineates what is unlawful and details 
the proper tests for determining liability. 
B. The Second Circuit’s Two Arguments Have Weaknesses 
In concluding that the personal benefit test does not apply to Section 
1348, the Blaszczak court relied primarily upon a single quote from the 
Senate Judiciary Report for Sarbanes-Oxley.200  The quoted portion of the 
report stated that Section 1348 would “supplement the patchwork of 
existing technical securities law violations with a more general and less 
technical provision, with elements and intent requirements comparable to 
current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.”201  The language of the 
quoted statement is ambiguous and narrow in scope.  What Congress 
meant when it said that this provision would supplement existing securities 
laws is arguably unclear.  As discussed above, the practical effect of 
Section 1348 is to provide a bypass around the personal benefit test.202  It 
seems unlikely that Congress’s idea of supplementing a law is  to render a 
portion of the law unnecessary.  The language is also narrow in its scope 
in that it only refers to Section 1348 having similar elements and intent 
requirements to bank and health care fraud statutes.203  It does not make 
 
 198. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
 199. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37. 
 200. Id. at 36. 
 201. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14 (2002). 
 202. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37. 
 203. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 30 (2002) (“Like the bank and health care fraud 
statutes on which this provision is modeled, prosecutors must prove that a defendant 
knowingly engaged in a scheme or artifice to defraud, or knowingly made false 
statements or representations to obtain money in a securities transaction.”). 
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any reference to current judicial doctrines in the existing securities laws, 
and it does not affirmatively discard any of them.204   
Furthermore, the quoted language becomes even less persuasive 
when viewed in the context of the rest of the report.  The report stated that 
Congress believed that existing securities fraud statues were adequate. 
However, it supported the creation of Section 1348 to make it easier to 
prosecute securities fraud in a “limited class of cases.”205  It seems 
speculative that Congress’s idea of a limited class of cases included 
essentially all cases of securities fraud, as there is nothing to prevent the 
DOJ from using Section 1348 in every insider trading case going forward.  
In fact, one example given by the report as a reason for Section 1348 was 
the elimination of the requirement that the government prove the 
defendant used the mail or wires to conduct the fraud.206  This example 
shows that Congress may have intended a more targeted approach rather 
than a wholesale change in securities law.  
While reasonable minds may disagree as to the meaning of the 
language of the Senate report, the circumstances under which Congress 
created Section 1348 also calls into question what the actual intent of 
Congress was.  As previously mentioned, Congress created Section 1348 
at “lightning speed”, amongst a political firestorm, in an election year, 
with a falling stock market, and in response to the financial scandals of 
Enron and others.207  Sarbanes-Oxley spanned 150 pages and created 
duplicative and inconsistent provisions scattered across three separate 
titles of federal law.208  It is also important to note that the financial 
scandals prompting Sarbanes-Oxley involved primarily accounting fraud 
and not insider trading.209  In its haste, it is a possible that Congress did 
 
 204. See generally id. 
 205. Id. at 30. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Perino, supra note 16, at 671–72. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Rosemary Carlson, The Enron Scandal That Prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/sarbanes-oxley-act-and-the-enron-scandal-393497 
[https://perma.cc/D75Q-QTB4].  Enron inflated profits and hid losses through dubious 
accounting practices that included unrealized future gains in current income 
statements and transferred troubled assets into limited partnerships. Peter Bondarenko, 
Enron Scandal, BRITANNICA (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/Enron-
scandal. WorldCom exaggerated its profits by inflating its net income and cash flows 
by recording expenses as investments. Adam Hayes, The Rise and Fall of WorldCom, 
INVESTOPEDIA (May 5, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/worldcom.asp 
[https://perma.cc/JQ6K-PTT5]. Officers of Adelphia Communications used 
approximately $2.3 billion in company funds for personal use and lied to investors 
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not realize the ramifications of its actions.  These circumstances call into 
doubt the notion that Congress appreciated the significance of Section 
1348 or understood that it would upend decades of securities law 
jurisprudence.  
The Second Circuit’s second argument that the personal benefit test 
is not required in the embezzlement theory of fraud is questionable.  The 
Blaszczak court reasoned that the embezzlement theory did not require 
proof of a personal benefit or proof of a breach of duty because 
embezzlement is always fraudulent.210  However, as argued in an amicus 
brief for the defense by law professors specializing in securities law, the 
cases on which the Blaszczak court relied in its embezzlement reasoning, 
Carpenter and O’Hagan, involved situations where the defendant already 
had a fiduciary duty and breached that duty by using the information.211  
In Carpenter, an employee used an employer’s confidential 
information.212  In O’Hagan, an attorney used confidential information 
from a firm’s client.213  Neither case addressed a situation where the 
defendant did not already owe a duty to disclose, so there is little for the 
Second Circuit to base its argument on.  At a minimum, O’Hagan and 
Carpenter evidence that the United States Supreme Court implicitly, if not 
explicitly, requires a breach of a duty in the embezzlement theory.214  In 
Blaszczak, because Blaszczak, Huber, and Olan owed no duty to CMS as 
outsiders, it seems that the personal benefit test would be necessary to 
determine whether a duty was inherited from Worrall, as an employee at 
CMS.215  The Court’s silence in Carpenter and O’Hagan cannot be 
definitive proof of the Blaszczak court’s argument.216 
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 213. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48. 
 214. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants’ 
Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 9–10, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d 
Cir. 2019). 
 215. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 26–28. 
 216. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Blaszczak, 
947 F.3d at 30–45. 
25
Meyer: Insider Trading Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Bypassing the Personal Bene
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
976 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Blaszczak, the Second Circuit upended decades of jurisprudence 
surrounding Rule 10b-5 and insider trading when it held that the personal 
benefit test does not apply to situations where a defendant is charged with 
securities fraud under Section 1348.217  The court’s decision complicates 
existing insider trading law by punishing similar conduct differently under 
either Rule 10b-5 or Section 1348, even while providing  an easier path 
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